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We discuss cryptographic applications of single-qubit rotations from the perspective of trapdoor
one-way functions and public-key encryption. In particular, we present an asymmetric cryptosystem
whose security relies on fundamental principles of quantum physics. A quantum public key is used
for the encryption of messages while decryption is possible by means of a classical private key only.
The trapdoor one-way function underlying the proposed cryptosystem maps integer numbers to
quantum states of a qubit and its inversion can be infeasible by virtue of the Holevo’s theorem.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern public-key (or else asymmetric) cryptography
relies on numerical trapdoor one-way functions, i.e., func-
tions that are “easy” to compute, but “hard” to invert
without some additional information (the so-called trap-
door information) [1]. The main characteristic of these
mathematical objects is that they provide the legitimate
users with a tractable problem, while at the same time
any unauthorized user (adversary) has to face a compu-
tationally infeasible problem. This barrier between le-
gitimate users and adversaries, due to complexity of ef-
fort, is the key idea behind most of the known public-key
cryptosystems. Each participant in such a cryptosystem
has to have a personal key consisting of two parts, i.e.,
the public and the secret (also known as private) part.
Messages are encrypted with use of the public key and
the decryption of the resulting ciphertext is possible by
means of the private key.
The security of conventional public-key cryptography
relies on the hardness of some computational problems
(e.g., integer factorization problem, discrete logarithm
problem, etc). These numerical problems are considered
to be good candidates for one-way functions (OWFs),
and this belief relies mainly on the large amount of re-
sources (computing power and time) required for their
solution using the best known algorithms. Nevertheless,
the fact that the existence of numerical OWFs has not
been proved rigorously up to now, makes all of the known
public-key cryptosystems vulnerable to any future ad-
vances in algorithms and hardware (e.g., the construction
of a quantum computer).
In contrast to the computational security offered by
conventional public-key schemes, there exist symmetric
cryptosystems (e.g., one-time pad) which offer provable
security provided that a secret truly random key is shared
between the entities who wish to communicate. To-
day, the establishment of such a key between two parties
can be achieved by means of quantum key-distribution
(QKD) protocols [2]. By virtue of fundamental principles
of quantum mechanics that do not allow passive moni-
toring and cloning of unknown quantum states [3], QKD
protocols provide a solution to the key-distribution prob-
lem even in the presence of the most powerful adversaries.
Nevertheless, the key management remains one of the
main drawbacks of symmetric encryption schemes [1]. In
particular, the problem pertains to large networks where
each entity needs a secret key with every other entity.
Hence, the total number of secret keys scales quadrati-
cally with the number of users in the network.
One solution to the key-management problem is the
use of an unconditionally trusted third party which is
burdened with the key management and acts as a key-
distribution center (KDC). The main problem with this
solution, however, is that the KDC itself becomes an at-
tractive target, while a compromised KDC renters imme-
diately all communications insecure. An alternative solu-
tion to the key-management problem is provided by con-
ventional public-key cryptosystems which are very flex-
ible but, as we discussed earlier, offer computationally
security only.
Clearly, an ideal solution to both of the key-
distribution and management problems is a quantum
public-key (asymmetric) cryptosystem, which combines
the provable security of QKD protocols with the flexibil-
ity of conventional public-key encryption schemes. The
development of such a cryptosystem, however, requires
the existence of quantum trapdoor OWFs. In particular,
the one-way property of these functions has to rely on
fundamental principles of quantum theory, rather than
unproven computational assumptions.
To the best of our knowledge, the number of related
theoretical investigations is rather small, and all of them
pertain to a futuristic scenario where all of the parties
involved (legitimate users and adversaries) possess quan-
tum computers. The concept of quantum OWF was first
introduced in [4, 5], where the authors demonstrated that
such a function can be obtained by mapping classical
bit-strings to quantum states of a collection of qubits.
Nevertheless, these two papers do not pertain directly
to public-key encryption, but rather to quantum fin-
gerprinting [4], and digital signatures [5, 6]. Later on,
Kawachi et al. [7] investigated the cryptographic prop-
erties of the distinguishability problem between two ran-
dom coset states with hidden permutation. This prob-
lem can be viewed as a quantum extension of the dis-
2tinguishability problems between two probability distri-
butions used in conventional cryptography [1]. Finally,
besides quantum OWFs there have been also investiga-
tions on OWFs which rely on “hard” problems appearing
in other areas of physics such as statistical physics [8], op-
tics [9], and mesoscopic physics of disordered media [10].
In this paper we establish a theoretical framework for
quantum public-key encryption based on qubit rotations.
In particular, we explore the trapdoor and one-way prop-
erties of functions that map integer numbers onto single-
qubit states. Moreover, we present an asymmetric cryp-
tosystem which is provably secure even against powerful
quantum eavesdropping strategies.
II. QUANTUM TRAPDOOR (ONE-WAY)
FUNCTIONS
In this section we introduce the notion of the quantum
trapdoor OWF, that maps integer numbers to quantum
states of a physical system. The discussion involves a sce-
nario where all of the parties (legitimate users and adver-
saries) possess quantum computers and are only limited
by the laws of physics.
A. Definition and properties
Definition. Consider two sets S and Q which involve
numbers and quantum states of a physical system, re-
spectively. A quantum OWF is a map M : S 7→ Q, which
is “easy” to perform, but “hard” to invert. A quantum
OWF whose inversion becomes feasible by means of some
information (trapdoor information) is a quantum trap-
door OWF.
Throughout this work we will focus on quantum trap-
door OWFs whose input is an integer s ∈ Zn :=
{0, 1, . . . , n − 1|n ∈ N}, and its output is the state of
a quantum system, say |φs〉. To elaborate further on the
terms “easy” and “hard”, consider a quantum system
initially prepared in some state |0〉 and let H be the cor-
responding Hilbert space. For a randomly chosen s ∈ Zn
we apply an operation Oˆ(s) : H 7→ H on the system,
which changes the initial state |0〉 → |φs〉 = Oˆ(s) |0〉.
The set of all possible output states of the quantum OWF
is Q ≡ { |φs〉|s ∈ Zn}, and belongs to H. If the map
M : Zn 7→ Q is a bijection there is a unique s ∈ Zn such
that |0〉 → |φs〉, i.e., M is one-to-one and |Zn| = |Q|.
The map s 7→ |φs〉 must be “easy” to compute in the
sense that, for a given s ∈ Zn, the transformation on the
system’s state |0〉 → |φs〉, can be performed efficiently
on a quantum computer with polynomial resources. On
the other hand, in order for the map s 7→ |φs〉 to serve as
a quantum OWF, its inversion must be a “hard” problem
by virtue of fundamental principles of quantum mechan-
ics. In other words, given a state |φs〉 chosen at random
from Q, there is no efficient quantum algorithm that suc-
ceeds in performing the inverse map |φs〉 7→ s (i.e., re-
covering the integer s from the given state |φs〉) with a
non-negligible probability.
Actually, by definition the inversion of a quantum
OWF is a hard problem for everyone (legitimate users
and eavesdroppers). For cryptographic applications,
however, authorized users should be able to identify the
state of the quantum system, and thus inverse the map
s 7→ |φs〉, more efficiently than any unauthorized party.
Hence, it is essential to introduce a trapdoor information
which makes the inversion of the map computationally
feasible for anyone who possesses it.
Having introduced the notion of quantum trapdoor
OWFs in a rather general theoretical framework, in the
following we specialize the present discussion to a partic-
ular family of such functions based on single-qubit rota-
tions.
B. A quantum trapdoor function based on
single-qubit rotations
For the sake of simplicity, we will present our quantum
trapdoor OWF in the context of single-qubit states lying
on the x − z plane of the Bloch-sphere. The main idea
can be easily extended to qubit states that lie on the
three-dimensional Bloch sphere.
Let us denote by { |0z〉, |1z〉} the eigenstates of the
Pauli operator Zˆ = ( |0z〉〈0z| − |1z〉〈1z| ), which form
an orthonormal basis in the Hilbert space of a qubit H2.
A general qubit state lying on the x − z plane can be
written as |ψ(θ)〉 = cos (θ/2) |0z〉+ sin (θ/2) |1z〉, where
0 ≤ θ < 2π. Hence unlike the classical bit which can store
a discrete variable taking only two real values (that is “0”
and “1”), a qubit may represent a continuum of states on
the x− z Bloch plane. Introducing the rotation operator
about the y axis, Rˆ(θ) = e−iθYˆ/2 with Yˆ = i( |1z〉〈0z| −
|0z〉〈1z| ), we may alternatively write |ψ(θ)〉 = Rˆ(θ) |0z〉.
The input of the proposed quantum trapdoor function
is a random integer s uniformly distributed over Z2n with
n ∈ N, and a qubit initially prepared in |0z〉. Thus, n-
bit strings suffice as labels to identify the input s for
fixed n. For given values of n ∈ N and s ∈ Z2n , the
qubit state is rotated by sθn around the y-axis with θn =
π/2n−1. Hence, for some fixed n ∈ N, the output of the
OWF pertains to the class of states Qn = { |ψs(θn)〉|s ∈
Z2n , θn = π/2
n−1}, with
|ψs(θn)〉 ≡ Rˆ(sθn) |0z〉
= cos
(
sθn
2
)
|0z〉+ sin
(
sθn
2
)
|1z〉. (1)
Clearly, both of the input and output sets (i.e., Z2n and
Qn, respectively) remain unknown if n is not revealed.
For a given pair of integers {n, s}, the function s 7→
|ψs(θn)〉 is easy to compute since it involves single-qubit
rotations only. In particular, it is known that any single-
qubit operation can be simulated to an arbitrary accu-
racy ǫ > 0, by a quantum algorithm involving a universal
3set of gates (i.e., Hadamard, phase, controlled-NOT, and
π/8 gates) [3]. Moreover, this simulation is efficient since
its implementation requires an overhead of resources that
scales polynomially with log(ǫ−1).
Inversion of the map s 7→ |ψs(θn)〉 means to recover
s from a given qubit state |ψs(θn)〉 chosen at random
from an unknown set Qn. Nevertheless, let us consider
for the time being that n is known. In this case, the
inversion of the map reduces to the problem of discrim-
ination between various non-orthogonal states chosen at
random from a known set Qn. The number of non-
orthogonal states increases as we increase n, whereas
for n >> 1 we have for the nearest-neighbor overlap
〈ψs(θn)|ψs+1(θn)〉 = cos(θn/2)→ 1. Hence, a projective
von Neumann measurement cannot distinguish between
all of the states for n >> 1, since the number of possible
outcomes in such a measurement is restricted by the di-
mensions of the state space of the system (i.e., qubit in
our case).
One has therefore, to resort to more general mea-
surements which can be always described formally by
a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) involving a
number of non-negative operators [3]. In the theoreti-
cal framework of POVMs, an input state is associated
with a particular outcome of the measurement, while op-
timization is typically performed with respect to vari-
ous quantities (e.g., probability of inconclusive results,
mutual information, conditional probabilities, etc). It is
worth noting, however, that some of these strategies are
not applicable for the states of the set Qn, since they
are not linearly independent when n > 2 (e.g., see Ref.
[11]). In any case, according to Holevo’s theorem [3], the
classical information that can be extracted from a single
qubit by means of a POVM is at most 1 bit, whereas n
bits required to identify the randomly chosen s ∈ Z2n for
fixed n. Hence, we see that for a given n ≫ 1 the map
s 7→ |ψs(θn)〉 acts as a quantum OWF that is “easy” to
perform but hard to invert. Actually, the inversion may
become even harder if n is not publicly announced, thus
rendering the sets from which s and |ψs(θn)〉 are chosen
(that is, Z2n and Qn, respectively) practically unknown
(see also discussion in Sec. IV).
The map s 7→ |ψs(θn)〉 may also act as a trapdoor
OWF when it involves two consecutive rotations. To
demonstrate this fact, let us assume that after Rˆ(sθn), a
second rotation Rˆ(mθn) is applied to the same qubit,
with a randomly chosen integer m ∈ Z2n such that
s + m = c mod 2n. The state of the qubit after
the second rotation becomes |ψc(θn)〉 = Rˆ(cθn) |0z〉 =
Rˆ(mθn)Rˆ(sθn) |0z〉. Having access to the qubit before
and after the second rotation (i.e., given the qubit states
|ψs(θn)〉 and |ψc(θn)〉), we are interested in deducing m.
This task, however, requires substantial information on
both of the numbers s and c, which is not possible for
n ≫ 1. More precisely, as discussed earlier, in this case
only negligible information can be extracted from the
state |ψs(θn)〉 about the randomly chosen s, which thus
remains practically unknown. Hence, irrespective of the
amount of information one may have on c, the number
m will also remain unknown. The one-way and trap-
door properties of the map s 7→ |ψs(θn)〉 will become
clearer in the following, through the security analysis of
an asymmetric quantum encryption scheme.
III. QUANTUM PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION
In this section we introduce an asymmetric cryptosys-
tem based on the quantum trapdoor OWF presented in
Sec. II. In analogy to classical asymmetric cryptosys-
tems, in the proposed protocol the encryption and the
decryption keys are different. In the following we de-
scribe the three stages of the protocol.
Stage 1 — Key generation. Each user participating
in the cryptosystem generates a key consisting of a pri-
vate part d, and a public part e, as determined by the
following steps.
1. Choose a random positive integer n≫ 1.
2. Choose a random integer string s of length N i.e.,
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ), with sj chosen independently
from Z2n .
3. Prepare N qubits in the state |0z〉
⊗N .
4. Apply a rotation Rˆ(j)(sjθn) on the jth qubit, with
θn = π/2
n−1. Thus, the state of the jth qubit
becomes |ψsj (θn)〉j = Rˆ
(j)(sjθn) |0z〉, and is of the
form (1).
5. The private key is d = {n, s}, while the public key
is e = {N, |Ψ
(pk)
s (θn)〉}, with the N -qubit state
|Ψ
(pk)
s (θn)〉 ≡
⊗N
j=1 |ψsj (θn)〉j .
Clearly in the proposed protocol, the private key is clas-
sical whereas the public key is quantum as it involves the
state of N qubits. Moreover, note that each user may
produce multiple copies of his/her own public key as the
quantum state is known, and thus its copying does not
violate the no-cloning theorem.
Stage 2 — Encryption. Assume now that one of
the users (Bob) wants to send Alice an r-bit message
m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mr), with mj ∈ {0, 1} and r ≤ N .
To encrypt the message, he should do the following steps
without altering the order of the public-key qubits:
1. Obtain Alice’s authentic public key e. If r > N , he
should ask Alice to increase the length of her public
key.
2. Encrypt the jth bit of his message, say mj, by
applying the rotation Rˆ(j)(mjπ) on the corre-
sponding qubit of the public key, whose state
becomes |ψsj ,mj (θn)〉j = Rˆ
(j)(mjπ) |ψsj (θn)〉j .
43. The quantum ciphertext (or else cipher state) is
the new state of the N qubits, i.e., |Ψ
(c)
s,m(θn)〉 =⊗N
j=1 |ψsj ,mj (θn)〉j , and is sent back to Alice.
Note that, at the end of the encryption stage, the mes-
sage has been encoded in the first r qubits of the cipher
state. Thus, in the decryption stage Alice may focus on
this part of the cipher state, discarding the remaining
N−r qubits, which do not carry any additional informa-
tion.
Stage 3 — Decryption. To recover the plaintext m
from the cipher state |Ψ
(c)
s,m(θn)〉, Alice has to perform
the following steps.
1. Undo her initial rotations, i.e., to apply
Rˆ(j)(sjθn)
−1 on the j-th qubit of the cipher-
text.
2. Measure each qubit of the ciphertext in the basis
{ |0z〉, |1z〉}.
In discussing the decryption stage, we would like to
point out that the above two steps are basically equiv-
alent to a von Neumann measurement which projects
the jth qubit onto the basis { |ψsj (θn)〉, Rˆ(π) |ψsj (θn)〉}.
Moreover, it is worth recalling here that Rˆ(j)(α)−1 =
Rˆ(j)(α)† = Rˆ(j)(−α), while different rotations around
the same axis commute, i.e., [Rˆ(j)(α), Rˆ(j)(β)] = 0.
IV. SECURITY
The primary objective of an adversary (eavesdropper)
is to recover the plaintext from the cipher state intended
for Alice. On the other hand, there is always a more am-
bitious objective pertaining to the recover of the private
key from Alice’s public key. A cryptosystem is consid-
ered to be broken with accomplishment of any of the two
objectives, but in the latter case the adversary has access
to all of the messages sent to Alice. In this section we
discuss various security issues related to the encryption
scheme of Sec. III
A. Distribution of public keys
In contrast to symmetric cryptosystems, in an asym-
metric cryptosystem a KDC is burdened with the dis-
tribution of public keys whose secrecy is not required.
Nevertheless, the KDC has to verify still the public key
of each entity participating in the cryptosystem. Typi-
cally, in conventional cryptography the outcome of this
verification is a public certificate which consists of two
parts; a data part which contains the public key as well
as information about its owner, and the verification part
with the signature of the KDC over the data part. Hence,
such a certificate essentially guarantees the authenticity,
or else integrity, of the public key of each entity.
Authentication is a crucial requirement for secure, clas-
sical or quantum, encryption schemes since without it
any encryption scheme is vulnerable to an impersonation
attack [1]. In modern cryptography, secrecy (confiden-
tiality) and authenticity are treated as distinct and inde-
pendent cryptographic goals [1]. In particular, public-key
encryption aims at confidentiality whereas other crypto-
graphic goals (such as data integrity, authentication, and
non-repudiation) are provided by other cryptographic
primitives including message authentication codes, dig-
ital signatures, and fingerprints. Following the same at-
titude, throughout this section we focus on the security
provided by the quantum encryption scheme under con-
sideration.
To emphasize, however, the importance of authenticity,
in the encryption stage of the protocol described in Sec.
III it is explicitly stated that Bob should be able to ob-
tain an authentic copy of Alice’s public key. A quantum
digital signature scheme for authentication purposes was
proposed in [5], and relies on mapping classical bit-strings
to multi-qubit states. We believe that the main results of
[5] can be also adapted to the single-qubit OWF discussed
here. Nevertheless, the creation of public certificates for
quantum keys is not an easy task, since digitally signing
an unknown qubit state is not possible [12]. In any case,
authentication of quantum messages remains an interest-
ing question in the field of quantum cryptography, but it
is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Secrecy of the private key
The private key of each entity consists of two parts i.e.,
d = {n, s}. The first part is a randomly chosen positive
integer with the only constraint being n ≫ 1. Never-
theless, to present quantitative estimates on the entropy
of the private key, in the following we consider that n is
uniformly distributed over a finite interval N˜ = [nl, nu],
with nl ≫ 1. Thus, the entropy of the first part of the
private key is H(n) = log2(|N˜|), where |N˜| denotes the
number of elements in N˜. The second part of the private
key involves a random integer string s, which is encoded
on the state of the N qubits of the public key. For a
given value of n, say n = ν, each random element of s
is chosen independently and has a uniform distribution
over Z2ν . Hence the sting s is also uniformly distributed
over ZN2ν ≡ {(a1, a2, . . . , aN )|aj ∈ Z2ν}, and its entropy
is given by H(s|n = ν) = Nν. The entropy of the en-
tire private key is given by the joint entropy H(n, s), i.e.,
H(d) = H(n) +H(s|n) = log2(|N˜|) +
∑
ν∈N˜ p(ν)H(s|n =
ν) = log(|N˜|) +N(nu + nl)/2.
Let us estimate now the classical information one may
extract from the quantum public key. For a given value
of n = ν, the jth element of s is chosen at random
from Z2ν , and the corresponding qubit of the public
key is prepared in the pure state |ψsj (θν)〉j . From an
adversary’s point of view, however, who does not have
access to sj , the jth qubit of the public key is pre-
5pared in a pure state chosen at random from the set
Qn=ν = { |ψsj (θν)〉 | sj ∈ Z2ν ; θν = π/2
ν−1}, with all
the states being equally probable. Accordingly, one can
easily show that for ν > 2, the density operator for the
jth qubit is of the form
σ
(j)
pk (θn=ν) =
1
2ν
2ν−1∑
sj=0
|ψsj (θν)〉jj〈ψsj (θν)| =
1
2
. (2a)
Summing over all possible values of n and taking into
account its uniform distribution over N˜, we obtain ρ
(j)
pk =
|N˜|−1
∑
n σ
(j)
pk (θn) = 1 /2. Moreover, each qubit is pre-
pared independently of the others, and thus the state of
the entire public key reads
ρpk =
∑
n∈N˜
∑
s∈Z2n
p(n, s) |Ψ(pk)
s
(θn)〉〈Ψ
(pk)
s
(θn)| =
1⊗N
2N
,
(2b)
while we obtain for the corresponding von Neumann en-
tropy S(e) =
∑N
j=1 S(ρ
(j)
pk ) = N .
The secrecy of the private key d is guaranteed by the
Holevo’s theorem. In particular, let us denote by I(x, d)
the mutual information between the private key, and a
variable containing the information an adversary (Eve)
may have obtained by performing quantum measure-
ments on the public key. Since the public-key qubits are
prepared at random and independently in pure states, we
have from Holevo’s theorem I(x, d) ≤ S(e) = N . Hence,
I(x, d)≪ H(d) provided
log2(|N˜|) +Nn¯≫ N, (3a)
where n¯ = (nu + nl)/2. Clearly, to satisfy condition (3a)
it is sufficient to have either n¯ ≫ 1 or log2(|N˜|) >> N .
In the protocol of the previous section, both of these
requirements are fulfilled simultaneously since n is chosen
at random from the set of positive integers N with the
constraint n >> 1. Hence, the inequality I(x, d)≪ H(d)
also holds that is, Eve’s information gain is much smaller
than the entropy of the private key d, which thus remains
practically unknown to her. Accordingly, the conditional
entropy H(d|x) is given by H(d|x) ≡ H(d) − I(x, d) ≈
H(d), which establishes the uniformity of the private key
over D = N˜×Z2n , after the measurements on the public-
key state.
So, we have seen that by making the public key avail-
able to every one, we do not compromise the security
of the protocol for n ≫ 1, i.e., the public key may re-
veal only negligible information about the private key.
When multiple copies of the public key, say k, are simul-
taneously in circulation, Eve’s mutual information with
the key increases, but is again upper bounded as follows
I(x, d) ≤ Nk. In this case, secrecy of the private key is
always guaranteed if
log2(|N˜|) +Nn¯≫ Nk, (3b)
which defines an upper bound on the number of copies of
the public key that can be issued. This is in contrast to
conventional public-key cryptosystems, where there are
no such limitations.
To summarize, the secrecy of the private key is guar-
anteed by the fact that the public key is quantum and
unknown to every one except Alice. Moreover, the state
of each public-key qubit is chosen at random and inde-
pendently of the other qubit states. In other words, there
is no redundancy or pattern in the public key, that could
be explored by a potential adversary. Information gain
on the state of the public key (and thus the private key),
can be obtained only by performing measurements on
the public-key qubits, at the expense of disturbing irre-
versibly their state. In any case, according to Holevo’s
theorem, this information gain cannot exceed one bit per
qubit and thus, for k copies of the public key simulta-
neously in circulation, the private key is secret as long
as condition (3b) is satisfied. Furthermore, by virtue of
the no-cloning theorem [3], Eve cannot create additional
copies of Alice’s quantum public key, besides the copies
provided by Alice or the KDC. In particular, the fidelity
of the clone for each public-key qubit is smaller than one
[13] and thus, the fidelity of the public-key clone drops
exponentially with the key length N .
Finally, it is worth noting that according to the key-
generation stage of Sec. III, there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the private key and the public key. As
a result, any information an adversary may obtain about
the state of the jth public-key qubit |ψsj (θn)〉j , is imme-
diately associated with the the jth element of the private
string s. One may alter this situation, by applying a ran-
dom permutation Π on the public-key qubits, before they
become publicly available. In this case, the jth element of
the private string s is mapped to the state of the Π(j)th
qubit (i.e., sj 7→ |ψsj (θn)〉Π(j)), which is unknown to Eve
if Π is unknown. Hence, even if Eve were able to know
precisely the state of each public-key qubit, she would
have to guess the right permutation in order to deduce
the private string s. From another point of view, permut-
ing the public-key qubits for a given private key is equiv-
alent to preparing the public-key qubits in states deter-
mined by a permutation of the private string Π(s), which
is unknown to Eve. In this case, the private key consists
of three parts, i.e., d′ = (n, s,Π). The corresponding
joint entropy is given by H(d′) = H(d)+H(Π|s, n), with
H(d) defined earlier. Accordingly, the left-hand side of
Eqs. (3) increases by H(Π|s, n), whereas the maximum
information gain for a potential adversary is determined
by the Holevo’s bound and remains constant.
In the following we analyze the security of our encryp-
tion scheme, against various types of attacks aiming at
the recover of the plaintext and/or the private key, from
the quantum ciphertext. These attacks are generaliza-
tions of the corresponding attacks on conventional asym-
metric encryption schemes [1]. In contrast, however, to
their classical counterparts, in the quantum attacks Eve
does not know the state of the quantum public key, but
6is allowed to perform arbitrary operations and measure-
ments on it. The only assumption in the following anal-
ysis is that Alice’s decryption device is manufactured so
that is automatically deactivated when it performs k con-
secutive decryptions on N -qubit states. In this way we
guarantee that no more than k copies of Alice’s public
key will be used. When these copies are exhausted, Al-
ice must generate a new pair of keys (e′, d′), and update
accordingly her decryption device. To this end, the old
private key may act as a quantum password, which en-
sures authorized access to the decryption device.
C. Chosen-plaintext attack
Typically, in a chosen-plaintext attack, Eve is al-
lowed to obtain a number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs
of her choice. More precisely, given k copies of Alice’s
public-key state ρpk, and k plaintexts in binary form
{a1, a2, . . . , ak}, with aj ∈ {0, 1}
rj and rj ≤ N , she
obtains a sequence of cipher states {ρ
(1)
e , ρ
(2)
e , . . . , ρ
(k)
e },
where
ρ(j)e =
ˆ˜R
(rj)
aj (π)ρpk
ˆ˜R
(rj)†
aj (π).
The collective rotation on rj qubits is defined as
ˆ˜R
(rj)
x (ϕ) ≡
rj⊗
i=1
Rˆ(i)(xiϕ). (4)
Subsequently, Eve may explore her database, in order to
decrypt an unknown message encrypted with Alice’s pub-
lic key, or gain further information on Alice’s private key.
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality,
in the following we assume that rj = N, ∀ j.
Let us discuss first whether Eve can gain significant
information, by encrypting plaintexts (i.e., obtaining ci-
pher states) of her choice. As discussed in the previous
subsection, Eve can obtain only negligible information
about the private key, by performing measurements on
the public-key qubits. Thus, for Eve the private key is un-
known, and uniformly distributed over D. Accordingly,
the state of the public key ρpk is chosen at random from
the ensemble {p(d), |Ψ
(pk)
s (θn)〉}, and is thus given by
Eq. (2b). Note now that this maximally mixed state
remains invariant under Eve’s rotations [16], and thus
any plaintext aj is mapped to the same cipher state, i.e.,
aj 7→ ρpk. Hence, on average, there is no information
gain for Eve. The same conclusion can be drawn on the
basis of Holevo’s theorem. In particular, since the state
of the public key is unknown to Eve, the cipher state is
also unknown to her. Hence, Eve can extract at most
Nk bits of information from measurements on all of the
k cipher states, which is negligible in view of condition
(3b).
The remaining question is whether Eve can use her
plaintext-ciphertext database, in order to decrypt Bob’s
message, which has been encrypted with the same public
key. First of all, recall that Bob encrypts his message
m ∈ {0, 1}r, by transforming the state of the public key
as follows
ρpk
m
−→ ρc =
ˆ˜R(r)
m
(π)ρpk
ˆ˜R(r)†
m
(π). (5)
As mentioned above, the mixed state ρpk remains in-
variant under these rotations, and thus all of the possi-
ble messages yield the same cipher state, i.e., ρc = ρpk.
Hence, Eve cannot distinguish between distinct messages,
and the encryption scheme under consideration is prov-
ably secure [14].
Finally, note that a protocol which is secure against
chosen-plaintext attacks, is also secure against less pow-
erful attacks, such as the ciphertext-only and the known-
plaintext attacks [1]. In the following, we analyze the
forward-search attack, that is a chosen-plaintext attack
adapted to small message spaces.
D. Forward-search attack
The forward-search attack can be very efficient (at
least for conventional cryptosystems) when the number
of all possible messages is small. In this case, Eve may
obtain multiple copies of Alice’s public-key, and create
the ciphertexts corresponding to each possible message.
Subsequently, she may try to deduce the encrypted mes-
sage, by comparing the unknown ciphertext with the ci-
phertexts in her database.
For the encryption scheme under consideration, how-
ever, the crucial information is not the actual angle of the
rotation, but rather whether a public-key qubit has been
rotated or not (see stage 2 in Sec. III). Hence, instead
of creating her own plaintext-ciphertext database, it is
sufficient for Eve to compare the cipher state sent from
Bob to Alice, with a copy of Alice’s public-key.
To analyze this attack, let us focus on an 1-bit mes-
sage m ∈ {0, 1}. Bob encodes his message by applying
the rotation R(mπ) on Alice’s public-key qubit, which
is prepared in a state |ψs(θn)〉 chosen at random from
Qn, for some n ≫ 1. To deduce Bob’s message, Eve
performs a SWAP test [4] between the cipher qubit sent
from Bob to Alice, and a copy of Alice’s public-key qubit.
In this way, she will learn whether the cipher-qubit state
has been rotated with respect to the state of the public-
key qubit. Such a test, succeeds with average probabil-
ity psuc = 3/4. Moreover, at the end of the test the
two qubits are entangled, and Eve cannot distinguish be-
tween them. Hence, she cannot compare Bob’s cipher
state with the public-key state more than once.
Alice and Bob can reduce considerably psuc, by en-
coding the message on the state of two, or more
public-key qubits. For instance, using two public-key
qubits in the state |ψs1(θn)〉1 ⊗ |ψs2(θn)〉2, the mes-
sage “0” is encoded by applying an operation randomly
chosen from the set {Rˆ(1)(0)Rˆ(2)(0), Rˆ(1)(π)Rˆ(2)(π)},
whereas “1” is encoded using an operation from the
set {Rˆ(1)(0)Rˆ(2)(π), Rˆ(1)(π)Rˆ(2)(0)}. Thus, to deduce
7Bob’s message, Eve has to identify correctly the opera-
tions performed on both qubits. In this case, Eve suc-
ceeds with probability psuc = (3/4)
2 ≈ 0.56; that is,
slightly better than random guessing. In general, when
each bit of a message is encoded to α qubits, Eve has to
perform α successive SWAP tests to deduce it, and the
average success probability is (3/4)α; that is worse than
random guessing for α > 3.
In the forward-search attack discussed above, Eve per-
forms independent (individual) SWAP tests between the
corresponding qubits of the cipher state and a copy of the
public key. The question arises here is whether Eve may
increase her probability of success, by performing collec-
tive measurements on all the qubits of the cipher state
and the public key. This issue deserves further investi-
gation, and will be addressed elsewhere. Nevertheless,
the mere fact that each public-key qubit is prepared at
random and independently of the others, suggests that
the optimal attack (i.e., the attack that maximizes Eve’s
probability of success), involves only individual measure-
ments on various qubit pairs, consisting of the corre-
sponding qubits of the cipher state and the public key.
In particular, as discussed in Sec. IVB, there is no re-
dundancy or pattern in the public key (and thus in the
cipher state) which could be explored in a collective mea-
surement.
E. Chosen-ciphertext attack
In this scenario, Eve has access to Alice’s decryp-
tion device, but not to the private key. Providing judi-
ciously chosen cipher states, she receives the correspond-
ing plaintexts. The only restriction is that Alice’s device
does not allow more than k decryptions onN -qubit states
with the same private key. As before, Eve’s objective is
to deduce the private key, or decrypt Bob’s message at
a later instant, when she does not have access to the
decryption device.
The chosen-ciphertext attack can be analyzed along
the lines of the previous sections. Let us discuss briefly,
for instance, the security of the private key. In a chosen-
ciphertext attack Eve can prepare arbitrary multi-qubit
states, not necessarily related to the public key. For in-
stance, Eve may ask for the decryption of an N -qubit
state ρe, where the qubits are entangled among them-
selves as well as with another ancillary system. Never-
theless, as soon as the qubits are input to the decryption
device, Eve has no access to them. First, the decryption
device undoes the initial rotations on the qubits, as de-
termined by the private key d. For Eve, who does not
have access to the private key, the input state is trans-
formed to a state ρ′e randomly chosen from the ensemble
{p(d), ˆ˜R
(r)†
s (θn)ρe
ˆ˜R
(r)
s (θn)}, i.e.,
ρe
d
−→ ρ′e =
∑
d∈D
p(d) ˆ˜R(r)†
s
(θn)ρe
ˆ˜R(r)
s
(θn), (6)
with the collective rotations given by Eq. (4). Eve learns
only the outcomes of the projective measurements per-
formed at the end of the decryption stage. According to
Holevo’s theorem, however, these outcomes cannot pro-
vide her with more than N bits of classical information
about the private key. Of course Eve has the chance to
perform up to k such decryptions, but as long as condi-
tion (3b) is satisfied, her information gain is not sufficient
to determine the private key.
V. DISCUSSION
In conclusion, we have discussed cryptographic ap-
plications of single-qubit rotations in the framework of
quantum trapdoor (one-way) functions. We also demon-
strated how such a function can be used as a basis for
a quantum public-key cryptosystem, whose security, in
contrast to its classical counterparts, relies on fundamen-
tal principles of quantum mechanics. More precisely, in
the proposed encryption scheme, each user creates a key
consisting of two parts: a private key, which is purely
classical, and a public key, which involves a number of
qubits prepared independently in states specified by the
private key. The sender encrypts his message on the re-
cipients public key by rotating the state of its qubits. A
potential adversary cannot deduce the encrypted message
without knowing the recipient’s private key.
One might have noticed here external similarities of the
proposed encryption scheme to the Y00 protocol [15]. To
avoid any misunderstandings, we would like to point out
some crucial differences between the two schemes. First
of all, the security of the Y00 protocol is claimed to rely
on quantum noise which renders the discrimination of
closely spaced mesoscopic states impossible. On the con-
trary, the security of the proposed public-key encryption
scheme relies on the Holevo’s bound and the no-cloning
theorem. Second, the Y00 is a symmetric encryption
scheme whereas the present work involves asymmetric
cryptosystems (different keys are used for encryption and
decryption). Third, in the Y00 protocol the two legiti-
mate users share a short secret key in advance, which is
expanded in the course of the protocol. No secret infor-
mation is necessary for the functionality of the present
protocol.
Various security issues pertaining to the proposed
asymmetric encryption scheme, have been analyzed in
the context of a futuristic scenario, where all of the en-
tities participating in the cryptosystem possess quantum
computers, and are connected via ideal quantum chan-
nels. There are various questions yet to be explored, es-
pecially in connection with the extension of the present
ideas to more realistic scenarios, where the legitimate
users are limited by current technology. For instance, in
the presence of a lossy quantum channel, quantum error-
correction codes can be used to increase the robustness
of the protocol. We have already seen that by encoding
1 bit on two qubits we make the encryption more robust
8against the forward-search attack.
In any case, the purpose of the present work was to
introduce certain basic ideas underlying quantum public-
key encryption, and set an appropriate theoretical frame-
work. We also demonstrated how fundamental properties
of quantum systems and certain theorems of quantum
mechanics may provide a barrier, due to complexity of
effort, between legitimate users and adversaries, which is
the cornerstone of quantum public-key encryption. We
hope that our results and discussion will stimulate fur-
ther investigations on these topics, so that light is shed
on crucial questions, pertaining to the power and the
limitations of asymmetric quantum cryptography. More-
over, such investigations might lead to the development
of practical public-key encryption schemes, or other prov-
ably secure quantum cryptographic primitives (e.g., dig-
ital signatures, hash functions, etc).
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